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 We can perceive shapes visually and tactilely, and the information
 we gain about shapes through both sensory modalities is integrated
 smoothly into and functions in the same way in our behavior in-
 dependently of whether we gain it by sight or touch. There seems
 to be no reason in principle we couldn't perceive shapes through
 other sensory modalities as well, although as a matter of fact we do
 not. While we can identify shapes through other sensory modalities
 -e.g., I may know by smell (the scent of mango) that the object
 causing my sensory experience is round- this is not perceiving an
 object as shaped, but rather inferring from the character of one's sen-
 sory experience and collateral information that an object of a certain
 shape caused it. That it is possible to perceive shape through other
 sensory modalities, however, is suggested by the case of bats and
 aquatic mammals like dolphins which navigate through their envi-
 ronment by a form of sonar. It is plausible that they have some
 form of auditory representation of space, and so of shape. These
 facts about shape perception raise important questions about the
 relation between those features of perceptual experience which are
 intrinsic to different sensory modalities and the nature of our per-
This content downloaded from 
            140.182.176.13 on Tue, 04 Aug 2020 21:29:24 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 326 KIRK LUDWIG
 ceptual representation of shapes, and, more generally, of the space
 within which we perceive shaped objects to be located.
 John Campbell's paper, "Molyneux's Problem" (see above), raises
 a number of interesting and important questions about the nature
 of our perception of shape properties, particularly the cross-modal
 nature of shape perception, and ties them to more general questions
 about the nature both of perceptual content -whether it should
 be understood externalistically- and of shape properties --whether
 they should be understood categorically or as analyzable ultimately
 in terms of dispositions of objects. The question Campbell starts
 with is
 Q1. "whether there is a difference between the phenomenal charac-
 ters of shape experience in sight and touch" (p. 301).
 This is one of the questions prompted by Molyneux's Question:
 Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his
 touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same
 metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt
 one and the other, which is the cube and which is the sphere.
 Suppose then the cube and the sphere placed on a table, and
 the blind man be made to see: Quaere: whether by his sight,
 before he touched them, could he distinguish and tell which
 was the globe and which the cube? (Locke 1975, II, ix, 8)
 If there is no phenomenal difference between perception of shape
 in sight and touch, then a man blind from birth whose sight is fully
 restored as an adult should, it seems, have no trouble visually distin-
 guishing the globe from the cube.1 Clearly, the nature of perceptual
 representation of shapes is important to answering Ql, and, in par-
 ticular, whether perceptual representation of shapes is constructed
 in some way out of different phenomenal or subjective features in
 tactile and visual sensory experience.
 While Campbell does not explicitly provide an answer to Ql, I
 believe the answer he favors is that there is no difference between
 the phenomenal characters of shape experience in sight and touch.
 However, the main aim of Campbell's paper is not to provide and
 argue for an answer to Ql, but rather to connect its answer to the an-
 swers to a number of other questions about the nature of perceptual
 experience of shape properties. The first of these is,
 1 raise some doubts in section 5 about the importance of there being no
 phenomenal difference between visual and tactile experience of shape for whether
 someone can know that he sees the same shape that he feels.
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 Q2. Ought we to be externalists2 about shape perception?
 Again, Campbell does not explicitly argue for externalism about
 perceptual representation of shape, but it seems clear that he is
 sympathetic to it. This question is in turn linked to the question,
 Q3. Are shape properties categorical properties or not?
 We will explore more fully below what being categorical comes to,
 but in the first instance the contrast is with properties that are
 dispositional properties or conceptually analyzable in terms of dis-
 positional properties. It is not clear that Campbell gives a definite
 answer to this question either, though it seems that he is in sympa-
 thy with the view that shape properties are categorical properties.
 The two issues raised by Q2 and Q3 are in turn linked to the answer
 to another question, namely,
 Q4. Is the cross-modal transfer of information about shape rational
 or not?
 Cross-modal transfer of information about shape is the coordination
 of perception of shapes through different modalities in the production
 of behavior, in the sense that the information gained is integrated
 into and functions in the same way in the production of behavior
 independently of the sensory modality through which it is received.
 The cross-modal transfer of information is rational iff it is the result
 of the subject's access to the representation of shape in the experi-
 ence itself. The alternative is that the cross-modal transfer of infor-
 mation is simply hardwired into us, a brute fact about our functional
 organization. On this view, there would be a physical explanation
 of it, and perhaps an evolutionary one, but no explanation which
 involved claims about the subject's recognizing that his perceptual
 experience was itself of an object of a certain shape. If we assume,
 as I think we should, that if something is in the content of one's per-
 ceptual experience, it is accessible to one in consciousness, then the
 2Campbell distinguishes between radical and modest externalism about shape
 perception. It is not clear to me how to understand 'modest externalism', but
 since Campbell's concern is clearly with what he calls 'radical externalism', I will
 concentrate on that. Radical externalism appears to be the view that the repre-
 sentational elements of perception of shape are entirely determined by relational
 properties of the perceiver, and, in particular, relations to objects possessing the
 properties the individual represents. (What I mean by 'relational property' is the
 following: A property P is a relational property iffdf necessarily, for all x, x has
 P iff there is a y such that y 5 x or any part of x and y is a contingent existent.)
 Henceforth, by 'externalism', I will mean this view.
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 second view reduces to the view that one's perceptual experiences
 of shape do not contain any representations of shape. The beliefs
 that would arise from perceptual experience about shapes would not,
 then, have their contents derived from the contents of the percep-
 tual experiences; rather, certain perceptual experiences that do not
 represent shapes would cause in us beliefs about shapes.3 It is un-
 clear to me, however, whether Campbell accepts the assumption on
 which this reduction depends. Again, while Campbell does not say
 outright that he thinks that the cross-modal transfer of information
 about shape is rational, he seems to be in sympathy with the view
 that it is.
 These questions give rise to a fourth question, which I believe is
 the main focus of Campbell's paper, namely,
 Q5. What is the relation between the answers to questions Q1-Q4?
 It is not as clear as it could be how Campbell wants to answer this
 question, but I think at least the following theses can be discerned.
 [T1] If shape properties are categorical, then perception of shapes is
 externalist.
 [T2] If perception of shape properties is externalist, then there is no
 difference between the phenomenal character of shape experi-
 ence in sight and touch.
 [T3] If externalism about shape perception is correct, then cross-
 modal transfer of information is rational.
 The path to these conclusions is complicated, and reconstruction of
 arguments for them requires some detective work. I am by no means
 confident that I have identified the arguments or theses correctly.
 But these theses, if correct, are important results, particularly [T2],
 which would establish a surprising connection between the categoric-
 ity of shape properties and how perceptual representation of shape
 is determined.
 With respect to the primary questions, Q1-Q4, my own view is
 that there is a phenomenal difference between perception of shapes
 3This also raises a question about whether what would occur in this case would
 count as perceiving shape, as opposed to merely identifying it through sight or
 touch, as, in our example above, we might, through smell, identify an object as
 round. If there is this connection between perception of an object's having a
 property and the object's being represented in the experience as having it, then
 there is cross-modal transfer of information in perception only if it is rational. I
 will leave aside this worry for the rest of the discussion.
This content downloaded from 
            140.182.176.13 on Tue, 04 Aug 2020 21:29:24 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 29. SHAPE PROPERTIES AND PERCEPTION
 in sight and touch,4 that externalism about perception of shape is
 incorrect, that shape properties are categorical, and that the cross-
 modal transfer of information in normal adult human beings is ra-
 tional. With respect to the relations among the answers to these
 questions, I think that they are by and large independent of one an-
 other, and, in particular, that none of [T1]-[T3] can be supported by
 showing that the antecedent entails the consequent. I will not argue
 in this paper that there is a phenomenal difference between percep-
 tion of shape in sight and touch, or that externalism about shape
 perception is false. I will argue that shape properties are categori-
 cal, and that the cross-modal transfer of information is rational. In
 part, my aim here is to show that the questions are most straightfor-
 wardly answered independently of the issues Campbell links them to.
 Finally, I will argue that Campbell has given us no reason to think
 that there is an entailment between the antecedents of [T1]-[T3] and
 their consequents.
 The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I consider question
 Q3, whether shape properties are categorical. In section 3, I take up
 question Q4, whether cross-modal transfer of information is rational.
 In section 4, I take up the relation between the categoricity of shape
 properties and internalism and externalism [T1]. That there is an im-
 portant connection must be a major thesis of Campbell's paper, for
 roughly half of the paper is taken up with a discussion of the nature
 of shape properties. But I can find no interesting connection between
 the question whether shape properties are categorical or not and the
 question whether perceptual content of shape properties is externally
 determined. In section 5, I take up, briefly, [T2] and [T3], and con-
 clude in section 6. Each of sections 2-5 can be read independently of
 the others. Thus, e.g., a reader primarily interested in the discussion
 of Campbell's arguments for [T2] could skip straight to section 4.
 4See (Martin 1992) for an interesting recent discussion of what this difference
 might come to. Martin argues that it is not, as O'Shaughnessy (1989) has urged,
 that there is no sense field in tactile experience of the sort there is in visual
 experience, but rather that visual experience is "experience of objects external
 to one as arranged in physical space," while tactile experience is "experience of
 objects as they come into contact with one's body"; he continues,
 one is aware of one's body and its limits and so aware of objects coming into
 contact with one's body as they discernibly affect those limits. Normal visual
 experience is essentially experience of objects as they fall within the visual
 field; tactual experience is essentially experience of objects as they press from
 the outside onto the limits of a felt sensory field. (p. 210)
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 2 Are Shape Properties Categorical or Not?
 Categorical properties are contrasted with powers, that is, with dis-
 positional properties, or properties which are definable by appeal to
 only logic and powers. The mark of a power, according to Campbell,
 is that it can be defined by the following formula,
 [P] X has P iff if circumstances C obtain, then X responds in
 way R
 (where the specification of way R does not make appeal to the prop-
 erty P being defined). In addition to powers, Campbell says there
 are conditional powers, which can be defined as follows,
 [CP] X has P iff if X has properties Q1,..., Qn, then in circum-
 stances C, X responds in way R.
 Campbell goes on to entertain the suggestion that shape properties
 might be, not powers, or conditional powers, but clusters of condi-
 tional powers, i.e., that shapes can be defined by the following form,
 where the fCPil stand for conditional powers:
 [CL] X has P iff X has CP1,...,CPn.
 Campbell identifies this as Shoemaker's proposal (1984 pp. 206-
 233) that all properties of spatio-temporal objects are clusters of
 powers as applied to shape properties in particular. This is not, I
 think, exactly right. The most important divergence between the
 way Campbell lays out the view he wishes to examine and Shoe-
 maker's more general thesis is that Shoemaker's thesis is about what
 we might call the 'metaphysical' nature of properties, and is not
 about how our concepts of properties are analyzed.5 Since Camp-
 bell characterizes the view he is concerned with as being about how
 to analyze the concept of a shape property, it is not Shoemaker's view
 as applied to shape properties. The divergence is important, because
 the proper method for deciding issues about conceptual and meta-
 physical necessity are (thought to be) different. It is not, however,
 crucial to Campbell's line of argument that the view he considers be
 51 am skeptical that there are any so-called metaphysical necessities which
 are not reducible to conceptual necessities. The examples which motivate the
 distinction, such as the putatively a posteriori discovery of the necessary truth
 that water consists of aggregates of H20 (and its isotopes) in the liquid state, are
 better understood as examples of the discovery of what concept 'water' expresses
 rather than of a new kind of necessity not grounded in our concepts. But I cannot
 pursue this issue further here.
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 Shoemaker's view. In what follows, the view I intend to be evalu-
 ating is the one presented in Campbell paper, whether or not it is
 Shoemaker's view.6 I take this view to hold that two properties are
 identical iff the concepts which pick them out are identical, and that
 the proper method for investigating the nature of properties is by
 analyzing the concepts which pick them out.
 Before considering more closely the proposal that shape properties
 can be analyzed in the form [CL], it is worth asking whether condi-
 tional powers really are distinct from simple powers. It appears that
 they are not, for any conditional power defined as in [CP] can be re-
 characterized in as in [P]. To see this, suppose we have a conditional
 power defined as above. Now let circumstances C* = C and X's
 having properties Q1,..., Qn. Then we have
 [RE] X has P iff if circumstances C* obtain, X reacts in way R.
 Thus, we could simply take the suggestion that shapes are clusters of
 conditional powers as the suggestion that they are clusters of powers,
 and simplify the discussion.
 To determine whether shape properties are categorical properties
 or not, we need to know more about what a categorical property
 is. Categorical properties are to be understood by what they are
 contrasted with. Categorical properties are properties that cannot
 be defined as in [P], [CP], or [CL]. Thus, we do not have to worry
 about their roles in explanations to explain what they are (see section
 3 of Campbell's paper). They will, however, have a special role to
 play in explanations, in virtue of categorical properties being the
 ground of dispositional ones (though there's no reason to suppose all
 6Shoemaker also makes some terminological distinctions that Campbell does
 not observe, and which I will not observe either. For example, Shoemaker draws
 a distinction between 'is dispositional' and 'is a power'. The former he treats
 as a predicate of predicates; the latter of properties. It should be noted also
 that Shoemaker is concerned with what he calls genuine properties, as opposed
 to (mere) Cambridge properties; according to Shoemaker, not every predicate
 expresses a property. Part of the motivation of his account is to provide a way of
 distinguishing between genuine properties and mere Cambridge properties. Gen-
 uine properties, however, as Shoemaker conceives them, are only properties which
 are involved in (genuine) changes; a third class of properties, neither genuine nor
 mere Cambridge properties, are those of abstract objects such as numbers, e.g.,
 being prime or being divisible by two. This last point in particular suggests,
 given the epistemological nature of Shoemaker's argument (see below), that his
 conclusion should really be recast as the claim that the only properties we could
 know objects to have are one's characterizable essentially in terms of powers, not
 that properties of spatio-temporal objects must be individuated by their causal
 powers.
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 categorical properties ground dispositional powers). What is it for a
 categorical property to ground a dispositional one?
 [G] P is the categorical ground of a disposition to R when C iff P
 is a categorical property and it is a causal law that if X has P
 and circumstances C obtain, then X responds in way R.
 To say it is a causal law that if X is P and circumstances C obtain,
 then X responds in way R, is not to give a definition or conceptual
 analysis of the predicate 'has P', but to make a remark about the
 nomic role the property picked out has in physically possible worlds.
 This is a contingent fact, and things could have been otherwise, and
 it must be established by a posteriori investigation.
 It is evident that there must be categorical properties, if there are
 dispositional ones. For, first, there must be properties which figure
 in the fundamental laws which explain why objects have the dispo-
 sitions that they do. And, second, if every property were spelled
 out dispositionally, so that our understanding of the concept which
 picked out the property were expressed in a counterfactual condi-
 tional, then there would be no properties for which we had concepts.
 Powers are defined in terms of conditionals. The antecedents and
 consequents must employ predicates that express properties. The
 conditional has no content until we specify what those properties
 are. If for each of those predicates we had to substitute a condi-
 tional, and then for each predicate in the substituted conditional
 another conditional, ad infinitum, then clearly no properties would
 be fixed at all.
 Now we are in a position to answer the question whether shape
 properties are categorical properties. It is sufficient (though perhaps
 not necessary) for a property not to be a categorical property that
 no biconditional of the form [P], [CP], or [CL] be necessarily true
 with a predicate expressing the property in the place of 'has P'.
 Representing the universally quantified biconditionals of these forms
 as predicates of properties as follows '[P](p)', '[CP](p)', and '[CL](p)',
 where p is a variable for the property being characterized, we can
 put the condition as follows:
 [C] (p)(p is a categorical property provided that it is not necessary
 that [P](p) or [CP](p) or [CL](p)).
 Are shape properties then categorical? It will help to ask a bit more
 particularly about what we have in mind in talking about shape
 properties. When we talk about an object's having a shape, e.g., of
 an object's being spherical, we ascribe a property to an object located
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 in space. Now consider the space which that object occupies. Can
 we speak of the shape of that region of space? Yes. For remember
 that we also represent the regions of space between and around the
 objects which we represent in it, and that this is essential to our
 representation of the shapes of those objects. But now in talking of
 the shapes of regions of space, we are not talking about an object
 in the usual sense, something which occupies space, and can move
 about within it, though we are clearly employing the same concepts
 as those we apply to objects. The two uses are of course connected:
 an object has a certain shape just in case the region of space it
 occupies (at a time) has the same shape.
 Let's take 'shape' as applied to regions of space first. Since space
 is thought of as causally neutral, the stage where the play takes
 place, rather than a participant in the action, it is not clear that
 there are any biconditionals of the form (3) true as matter of fact of
 shape properties of regions of space, let alone necessarily true. Our
 concept of shape properties then cannot be captured by our concept
 of any cluster of powers. This is the central difficulty in trying to
 analyze shape properties in terms of powers. Powers are properties
 of objects. If they are objects which have shapes, they have spatial
 locations. Their shapes, however, are understood in terms of the
 geometry of the regions of the space in which they are located. Our
 conception of that space and its geometry is independent of that of
 the objects located within it.7 Thus, our understanding of the shape
 properties of objects could not be reduced to powers which they
 possess, since this leaves no room for an independent conception of
 the geometry of the space in which they are located and in terms of
 which their shapes are understood.
 Now consider 'shape' as applied to objects. We understand what
 it is for an object to have a shape in terms of the shape of the region
 of space it occupies. Does the shape of an object necessarily have
 any consequences for what it will do in various circumstances? This
 depends, I think, more on our concept of an object than on our
 concept of shape. To see this, consider the contrast between rigid
 and non-rigid objects. A rigid object is one that retains its shape
 (and size) under all conditions (that is, the distance between any
 two points in it remains constant through all forces exerted upon it).
 A non-rigid object is one that does not. This is not a contingent
 fact about rigid objects; nothing counts as a rigid object of which
 7This assumes, as I think correct, that spatial relations cannot be reduced to
 relations among objects; arguments to the contrary from a principle of sufficient
 reason or verificationism rest on doubtful premises.
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 this is not true. (In point of fact, there are no rigid objects; rigid
 objects are an idealization in physics, like a frictionless plane.) A
 rigid and non-rigid object could have the same shape. But they will
 do different things in different circumstances. For example, the rigid
 square peg will not go through a hole in a rigid board whose diameter
 is the same as the length of the peg's sides; a non-rigid peg may well
 do so -e.g., a square peg made of clay. It is not the shape and size
 of the peg relative to that of the hole in the board that determines
 whether or not it will pass through it, but rather the dispositions of
 the peg and board to retain their shapes in various circumstances.
 Since we understand the contrast between rigid and non-rigid ob-
 jects in terms of their dispositions to retain or not retain their shapes
 and sizes in various circumstances, and this distinction is crucial to
 saying what an object of a certain shape will do in various circum-
 stances, it is clear that shape properties cannot be defined in terms
 of clusters of powers of objects. For to try to understand it that way,
 we would have to appeal to the concept of rigidity, which presupposes
 a prior grasp of the concept of shape.
 The problem becomes painfully obvious when we consider inserting
 a characterization of rigidity into a characterization of shape in terms
 of rigidity.
 [RI] X is rigid iff for any shape S, and Size Z, if X has S and Z,
 then no matter what the circumstances C, X has S and Z.
 Consider now how one might try to turn this around into a partial
 definition of shape in terms of what an object will do if it is rigid:
 [RV] X has S only if, if X is rigid, then no matter what the circum-
 stances, X has S.
 There are really two problems here. First, of course, we have seen
 that 'rigid' is defined in terms of shape. Second, even apart from
 that, we see that the particular shape we are attempting to de-
 fine here has to be mentioned in the consequent of the conditional.
 Clearly, no progress has been made.
 Before leaving this section, we should take a brief look at two fur-
 ther matters. The first is the functional definition of shape properties
 which might be proposed to avoid the circularity problem (Camp-
 bell, p. 311). The second is Shoemaker's arguments, as represented
 by Campbell, that properties have to be understood as dispositional
 all the way down.
 To get around the charge of circularity, Campbell suggests we can
 introduce the shape property by way of a description of it as the
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 property which has a certain role in a theory of shape properties
 obtained in the following way. Consider a particular shape property
 S. Suppose it is definable as a cluster of conditional powers (or
 simply powers),
 [To] (x)(x has So iff if x has Q, then if C, x will R
 and if x has Q1, then if C1, x will R1
 and if x has Q2, then if C2, x will R2
 and if x has Q, then if Cn, x will R,).
 Note that in the [Cils we will have to mention shape properties.
 Now, summarize the open sentence on the right hand side of the bi-
 conditional as 'To(x, So,... , Sk), where the [Sil represent the terms
 referring to shape properties in the specification of the circumstances.
 Now we represent the definition of So as follows.
 [Defc-So] (x)(x has So iff To(x, So,..., Sk)).
 This is a circular definition (since we will need to say how objects
 of the same shape interact in characterizing the dispositions of an
 object of any shape). Now, take the conjunction of all the true
 biconditionals of the form of [Defc-So], and represent this as a theory:
 [Ti] Ti(So,...,Sr).
 Now replace each of the terms referring to shape properties with
 distinct variables and existentially quantify over each of the variables
 to get:
 [T2] (3$0)(s1)-...(3sr)Tl(so, -, Sr)
 This is the Ramsey sentence for [Ti]. Now, call the predicate ob-
 tained from [T2] by removing the existential quantifier over the i-th
 variable [T2(si)]. Now, we can define each property Si as follows:
 [Def-Si] (x)(x has Si iff x has (isi) T2(si)).8
 I want to note two points here. First, it is obvious that this is
 not how we understand shape properties, since there are an infinite
 number of shape properties, so that above the values of 'k' and 'r' will
 be infinite, and we clearly could not grasp the resulting proposition.
 Second, and quite apart from this, [Def-Si] does not define [Sil in
 terms of powers, for it is not strictly a definition. For all that [Def-
 Si] says [Sil could denote a categorical property. This is because
 8Where as usual '(isi)' is interpreted as 'the si such that'.
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 [Def-Si] fixes the property picked out by FSil by description. It is
 whatever unique property plays the appropriate role in the theory.
 That property, for all that has been said, may well be a categorical
 property. [Def-Si] fixes the meaning of Fhas Si] in the way one fixes
 the referent of a name by a description such as 'the first child born in
 the 21st century'. The description does not give the meaning. Thus,
 there is no reason to think that in fixing what property fSil denotes
 in this way we have determined it to denote a property definable
 in terms of clusters of powers. Thus, this is not a response to the
 objection that definitions of shape properties in the form [CL] are
 going to be circular, and so fail as definitions.9 In conversation,
 Shoemaker has told me that this is not part of his aim, and that
 the content of his thesis is exhausted by the claim that the above
 biconditional is necessarily true.
 Now let's turn to the arguments adapted by Campbell from Shoe-
 maker. As I noted above, I think there are some important differ-
 ences between the position that Campbell characterizes and Shoe-
 maker's. I will be considering the arguments advanced below as
 they bear on the position that shape properties and properties in
 general are understandable in terms of powers as it is characterized
 by Campbell. It is clear that, in at least some cases, the arguments
 are not applicable to Shoemaker's own position.
 The overall form of the argument is the following:
 91 would like to insert a brief query about Shoemaker's own official proposal,
 which is represented as a criterion for individuating properties. Modified to meet
 an objection of Richard Boyd's (Shoemaker 1984, p. 233), it goes as follows,
 P1 = P2 iff necessarily, for all causal potentialities CP, P1 has CP iff P2 has
 CP and for all circumstances C, C is sufficient to bring about a thing's having
 P1 iff C is sufficient to bring about a thing's having P2.
 Put this way, one can see that there is a striking parallel between Shoemaker's
 proposal for individuating properties and Davidson's for individuating events
 (Davidson 1980). Thus, it looks as if it suffers from the same defect Quine (1985
 p. 166) pointed out in Davidson's attempt to individuate events in terms of their
 causes and effects. Since causal potentialities and circumstances quantified over
 on the right hand side of the biconditional themselves involve properties, that is,
 they are partly individuated in terms of what properties they involve, the right
 hand side of the biconditional above presupposes the individuation of properties,
 and so cannot explain in what their individuation consists. Whether this criti-
 cism applies to Shoemaker's account depends in part on what he means when he
 says that he is giving individuation conditions for properties. Quine's criticism
 presupposes that in giving individuation conditions for a kind of entity, the con-
 ditions one gives do not presuppose one already understands how to individuate
 the kind of entity in question.
This content downloaded from 
            140.182.176.13 on Tue, 04 Aug 2020 21:29:24 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 29. SHAPE PROPERTIES AND PERCEPTION
 [A] 1. If properties are categorical, then we can never know that
 any object has them.
 2. Whatever properties there are, we can know that some object
 has them.
 3. Therefore, there are no categorical properties.
 A first remark to make is that since there have to be categorical
 properties if there are powers, a further conclusion can be drawn
 from 3, namely,
 4. There are no properties, i.e., no object has any property.
 Since there are objects only if they have properties, it follows,
 5. There isn't anything.10
 This is a conclusion sufficiently absurd to lead us to suppose that
 something has gone wrong with the argument for it.
 First, there is no reason to think 2 is true. There may be many
 properties which objects have which we don't and can't know that
 they have because of the nature of the properties, or because of the
 nature of ourselves. Second, none of the reasons offered for 1 are any
 good. As represented by Campbell, these are:
 [R1] If there are categorical properties, then it 'ought to be possible
 for there to be properties which make no difference whatever
 to the behaviour of the things which possess them.' (p. 311)
 [R2] If there are categorical properties, then there 'could be different
 properties that make, under all possible circumstances, exactly
 the same contribution to the causal powers of the things that
 have them.' (p. 311)
 [R3] If there are categorical properties, then the 'potential of a par-
 ticular property for contributing to the production of causal
 powers might change over time.' (p. 311)
 Consequently,
 [C] '[W]e could have no knowledge of the properties of a thing -
 since all we can know is the behaviour of the thing- and we
 would have no way of singling out a property in order to name
 it, and even if we did somehow manage to christen a property,
 there would be no way... in which we could know that we had
 encountered the same property again.' (p. 311)
 '10r, rather, anything except abstract objects, in line with the qualification in
 footnote 6.
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 There is nothing in the concept of a categorical property which li-
 censes any of [R1]-[R3]. What is required for properties to be cate-
 gorical is that there be no biconditionals of the form [CL] (or [P] or
 [CP]) which define them. With respect to [R1], it is compatible with
 this being so for shape properties that it is necessary that shape prop-
 erties make a difference to the causal powers of the objects that have
 them, for that does not require that they make the same difference
 in every possible world. With respect to [R2], it is compatible with
 this being so that different shape properties necessarily make a dif-
 ferent difference to an object's causal powers. With respect to [R3],
 it is compatible with this that shape properties necessarily make the
 same difference to an object's causal powers at every time. Further-
 more, even if [R1]-[R3] were true, it is not clear that it would follow
 that we could have no knowledge of the properties of a thing. It is
 clear that the proponent of this argument supposes that we can have
 knowledge of dispositional properties, and since not all properties of
 objects can be inferred from antecedent knowledge of the objects'
 having other properties, on pain of an infinite regress, we must be
 capable of knowing for some properties and some objects that the
 objects have the properties without inferring that they do. The epis-
 temic problem that the objector to categorical properties envisages
 rests on the assumption that we must infer that objects have cate-
 gorical properties from the effects of their having those properties.
 Their effects will be manifested as properties of some objects that we
 can know the objects have non-inferentially. Clearly, to be consis-
 tent, the proponent of the argument must suppose those properties
 are powers or definable in terms of powers. Thus, the proponent
 of the current argument must hold that we can know directly that
 objects have dispositional properties, but that there is some special
 obstacle that prevents us from knowing directly that objects have
 categorical properties. But what is that obstacle? If we could know
 directly that objects have dispositoinal properties, why could we not
 know directly that objects have categorical properties? Indeed, the
 objector's assumption that we would have to infer what properties
 objects have from direct observation of (some at least of) their dis-
 positional properties seems to get things upside down. If there is a
 priority of knowledge of the one sort of property over knowledge of
 the other sort, knowledge of the dispositional properties of objects
 should rest on knowledge of categorical properties of those objects.
 For we only know what powers a thing has by inductive reasoning.
 To discover a thing's powers, we must see what it does in various
 circumstances, i.e., we must have access to the manifestations of its
 powers. But these manifestations can't (ultimately) be themselves
This content downloaded from 
            140.182.176.13 on Tue, 04 Aug 2020 21:29:24 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 29. SHAPE PROPERTIES AND PERCEPTION
 powers if our inductive reasoning is to have materials to work on to
 begin with. Thus, it seems that even if we grant [R1]-[R3], we have
 no reason to suppose we could not know that objects had categorical
 properties, and we have reason to think that unless we could know
 that objects had categorical properties, we could not know that they
 had dispositional properties or properties definable in terms of dis-
 positional properties.
 To summarize, we have seen that shape properties are categorical
 properties, that there is no response to the circularity objection in
 appeal to definition by way of Ramsey sentences, and that none of
 the arguments against shape properties being categorical properties
 we have examined are any good. Furthermore, our treatment of these
 issues has not required us to make any commitments about how the
 contents of our perceptual representations of shape are determined.
 3 Is Cross-Modal Transfer of Information
 Rational?
 We described the phenomenon of cross-modal transfer of information
 in a way that was neutral with respect to the two interpretations of
 it. Both of the interpretations are prima facie conceptually possible.
 In particular, it seems possible for the brute functional organization
 thesis to be true of some creatures who have concepts of shape.11 It
 also seems conceptually possible for perceptual experiences to con-
 tain in their contents representations of space and of shaped objects
 within that space (to which the perceiver has access). If both op-
 tions are conceptually possible, then if we are to answer the question
 whether cross-modal transfer of information is rational, we cannot
 do so for all possible perceivers. We must relativize the question to
 particular groups of perceivers.
 Clearly, the thesis that cross-modal transfer of information is ra-
 tional, since it involves a claim about the content of perceptual expe-
 rience and access to that content by the perceiver, can't be answered
 on the basis of behavioral evidence. The behavioral evidence will be
 compatible with either alternative. Therefore, where we can have no
 insight into the character of the experience from the point of view of
 its subject, we must be skeptics about the answer to the question.
 11If there is some difficulty about this, it would have to be because of some
 important connection between the ability to possess the concept of space and the
 ability to experientially represent space. It is tempting to suppose that there is
 such a connection, but I cannot see how to make good on the claim.
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 FIGIUR.E 1. Necker rcuhe  FIGURE 2. Penrose triangle.
 This is plausibly the case with animals, and with infants and young
 (enough) children. I propose then to reformulate the question so
 that it is specifically about the phenomenon as it appears in normal
 adult human beings. Henceforth I will understand the question in
 this way.
 Given that we have access to the contents of our conscious percep-
 tual experiences, the question whether cross-modal transfer of infor-
 mation is rational comes down to the question whether we are aware
 of representations of shaped objects as part of our visual and tactile
 experiences of our environment. What is the answer to this ques-
 tion? I think we obviously do have access to such representational
 information in the content of our perceptual experiences. When I
 look out my window, I have a visual experience of, as I would put
 it, a number of heads, on a number of shoulders; that is a remark
 about the content of the experience, and in particular conveys some
 (not very precise) information about the shapes of objects which my
 visual experience represents. Likewise, as I hold this pen in my hand,
 I have a tactile experience of (and as of) a cylinder, as I would put
 it, which conveys information about the representational content of
 the tactile experience, and, in particular, about shapes of objects
 which it represents. As I look at the pen, my visual experience also
 represents it as cylindrical. These representational features of my
 experience are transparent to me, for my experiences phenomenally
 seem to put me in direct contact with the world that they represent,
 and I am representing a three dimensional spatial world containing
 objects of various shapes at various distances from me. It does no
 good to protest that this representational content is not part of the
 content of my perceptual experiences, but rather just of my beliefs,
 for even if I suspend belief about my environment, my perceptual
 experiences still represent it as being the same way. This is the pos-
 sibility upon which hallucinations and illusions which persist through
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 discovery depends, such as a 3-dimensional Necker cube (Figure 1),
 or Ames's distorted room (see Gregory, pp. 85-7), and the percep-
 tual representation of objects recognized to be impossible (such as
 the Penrose triangle (Figure 2)). The question whether cross-modal
 transfer of information is rational in our case, then, seems to admit
 of a straightforward and incontrovertible answer: it is.
 Before moving on, let us ask whether we find any reason to be
 skeptical of this result in the case of the man who is the subject of
 Molyneux's question, a man born blind, who can recognize by touch
 a sphere and a cube, whose sight is restored as an adult. Molyneux's
 question is whether he would be able to recognize by sight the sphere
 and the cube, that is, to know that the object which he sees is of the
 same shape as the object which he feels, when he sees the sphere,
 or cube, and when he touches it. How might the results of this
 experiment be used against the above claim? Suppose that the man
 could not at first recognize the object identified as the sphere by
 touch as that object by sight, but later comes to be able to do so.
 Then it might be urged that the connection is purely a functional
 one, since the content of his visual experience has not changed, and
 he could not originally make the identification, and surely at the end
 of the process his experience will be the same as ours.
 There have been actual cases like the one imagined by Molyneux,
 in which an individual blind from birth because of opacity of the
 cornea, or because of cataracts, has had his sight restored by an op-
 eration. The empirical facts are not easy to interpret, however. In
 some of these cases, individuals required a long period of training
 to recognize and name even simple objects or shapes by sight. In
 others, they were able to see well almost immediately. The cases are
 difficult to interpret, because it is difficult to sort out by behavior
 cases in which physiological function has been restored completely
 from those in which it has been restored partially at first, and fully
 only slowly if at all. There does seem to be some suggestion that
 where the operation, as in cornea transplants, results immediately
 in a clear image on the retina, the individual is able almost immedi-
 ately to recognize by sight objects which he is familiar with through
 touch. (See Gregory 1990, pp. 201ff.) However, whatever the em-
 pirical facts, the answer to Molyneux's question does not have the
 power to upset the conclusions above. The actual empirical facts are
 limited to whether or not the subject is able immediately to recog-
 nize shapes by sight or not, and then becomes able to do so later
 on. The objection considered above depends on making two further
 assumptions, which amount to an explanation of the empirical facts.
 The two assumptions, as we saw, are that the perceiver's experience
 341
This content downloaded from 
            140.182.176.13 on Tue, 04 Aug 2020 21:29:24 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 342 KIRK LUDWIG
 does not change its character, and that his experience when he can
 identify shapes by sight is the same as ours. The empirical evidence
 is compatible with denying either of these. Thus, e.g., in coming to
 identify shapes as we do, our imagined subject may well have sub-
 jective experience of the sort we do, but as a result of the character
 of his perceptual experiences changing from the time when his sight
 was initially restored. This would be much the most likely explana-
 tion, in light of the fact that the representational content of visual
 experiences is a feature of its phenomenal content. Contrast audi-
 tory perception of an uttered sentence when one understands it and
 when one does not, or perception of script which one understands
 with perception of script which one does not. Or, again, consider
 the difference between different ways of seeing an ambiguous figure,
 such as the duck-rabbit, or a Necker cube. In all these cases, changes
 or differences in the representational content of the perceptual ex-
 perience clearly affect what it is like to have them. Even if we did
 have good reason to think, however, that the subject's subjective ex-
 periences had not changed, there would still be explanations of the
 data compatible with the result reached above. Thus, e.g., we might
 think his experience was not in fact similar to ours, that in his case
 there was only a functional connection. It is hard to see, in fact, how
 the (third person) empirical evidence could overturn our first person
 authority over what the contents of our perceptual experiences are
 like. Therefore, even if a man blind from birth whose sight is re-
 stored would not be able identify the object he sees as the sphere he
 touches as opposed to the square that he touches, it would not show
 that cross-modal transfer of information is not rational in our case.
 Thus, the answer to the question whether cross-modal transfer of
 information is rational is 'yes', and the answer can be given indepen-
 dently of any considerations that have to do with externalism or the
 nature of shape perception.
 4 How Are the Issues of the Categoricity of Shape
 Properties and Externalism about Perception of
 Shape Properties Related?
 It is not easy to see why Campbell thinks that the question whether
 shape properties are categorical is relevant to the question whether
 perceptual representation of shape properties is externalist. The
 question of the nature of shape properties enters into the discussion
 in the following passage:
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 This gives one way of setting up the question of the sameness or differ-
 ence of shape perception in sight and touch. But you might object that
 this is quite the wrong way in which to set up the problem. You might
 object that we have to think of shape properties in terms of their causal
 significance, and that shape perception is perception of this causal sig-
 nificance. In this section I will develop this causal approach to shape
 perception. Then I will argue that the approach is incomplete, and that
 there is still a crucial issue that is addressed by externalism about phe-
 nomenal experience of shape. (p. 304)
 The 'sameness or difference of shape perception in sight and touch'
 refers here to whether there are phenomenal differences between per-
 ception of shape in sight and touch. It is not clear exactly what
 Campbell has in mind by 'this way of setting up the problem': the
 problem does not require setting up, it is expressed in a simple ques-
 tion, Q1. So it is mysterious what objection we are to imagine is
 being raised by the thought that shape properties are to be under-
 stood in terms of their causal significance (as clusters of powers (or
 conditional powers)). It is evident, though, from the last line of this
 passage, that Campbell thinks that this approach to understanding
 shape properties fails -'is incomplete'- and that externalism is re-
 quired in some way to address some 'crucial issue'. What is that
 crucial issue? How do we work our way around from a discussion
 of the nature of shape properties to whether the representation of
 those properties in perception is externally determined or not?
 The transition takes place in two steps. First, we are invited to
 reflect on what perceiving shapes would come to on the view of shape
 properties as definable as clusters of conditional powers. Campbell
 represents this as a pressing need for the proponent of the cluster of
 powers view of shape properties:
 On the face of it, we do not perceive the shape of a thing as a collection
 of unsubstantiated threats and promises as to which powers it will take
 on in various hypothetical circumstances. We perceive the substance
 behind the threats and promises. So we need some preliminary explana-
 tion of what it could mean to perceive an object as having a cluster of
 conditional powers, before we can understand the argument that that is
 all we perceive the object to have.12 (p. 306)
 12Campbell does not explain how he is using the expression 'perceiving x as
 ...', but I will take this to mean that the representational content of the percep-
 tual state involved represents x as falling under the concept expressed by what
 goes in for '... '.
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 Campbell spends some time saying what it could mean, but the
 question and time spent are not well-motivated. What it means is
 as clear as the thesis that shape properties are definable as clusters
 of conditional powers. It is not a motivation for asking after the
 meaning of some claim that it is in conflict with common sense. At
 most that is a reason for inquiring after its truth. What it means
 is just that in perceiving something as having a certain shape, we
 perceive it as being such that in such and such conditions, it behaves
 in such and such ways, which conditions and ways depending on the
 shape in question. Of course, this has implications for our behavior,
 given that we are rational agents, as Campbell points out at length,
 but adding what those implications are, given our desires, does not
 shed any further light on what the claim is. In any case, this exercise
 sets up the next transition, which is the observation that if we want
 to deny that shape properties are wholly analyzable as clusters of
 conditional powers, then we must suppose that perception of shape
 properties involves "more" than perception of clusters of conditional
 powers.
 On the alternative view, these connections [between having a shape
 and reacting in such and such ways in such and such conditions] do not
 exhaust the content of shape perception. In addition to these connec-
 tions, shape perception provides knowledge of the shape property as the
 ground of all the functional patterns that are specified. The problem
 then is to explain just what this further knowledge provided by shape
 perception is, and to explain its relation to these further connections and
 patterns of functional role. (p. 312)
 It should be noted that if shape properties are categorical properties,
 then it is understating the case to say that 'these connections do not
 exhaust the content of shape perception'. They are not part of the
 content of shape perception as such at all. But we may grant the
 point that if shape properties are categorical, one must accept that
 perception of shape properties is perception of categorical properties.
 It is this point that apparently brings us back to the question of
 whether externalism about shape perception is correct. Campbell
 calls perception of shape as categorical 'primitive consciousness of
 shape'. (I cannot see that 'primitive consciousness of shape' comes
 to more than this.) Now, how do externalism and internalism enter
 into the picture? The transition takes place in the following passage:
 The kind of primitive consciousness of shape I am describing is...
 extremely primitive. There would be none of the complex of functional
 connections to action and imagistic reasoning which I described earlier.
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 That means that we have to consider the question what makes it so that
 this consciousness is consciousness of shapes. (p. 314)
 It is to respond to the question posed in the last sentence here that
 Campbell turns to discuss externalism and internalism. The question
 is to be motivated by the first 2 sentences, tying it to the discussion
 of the nature of shape properties. It is difficult, however, to see the
 bearing of the first two sentences on the last. Primitive consciousness
 of shape just is perception of shapes as categorical, i.e., perception
 of shapes, if shape properties are categorical properties. Then of
 course it follows that such perception of shapes is not perception as
 such of clusters of conditional powers, and as such does not enter into
 deliberations about what to do in the way that perception of clusters
 of conditional powers would. Why does that mean that we have to
 consider the question "what makes it so that this consciousness is
 consciousness of shapes?"
 In any case, internalism and externalism enter at this point. Ex-
 ternalism is supposed to provide the following answer to the ques-
 tion: since the "geometrical aspects of your experience of objects
 are constituted by the geometry of the objects in your surround-
 ings," "... the character of experience as perception of shape can be
 secured without having to consider the relations of the perception
 to imagery and action" (p. 314). Internalism, too, is supposed to
 be prima facie in a position to answer the question: "an internalist
 account of shape experience, on which sensations are configured in
 a sensational space... would also suggest the possibility of a kind
 of primitive awareness of shape, on which it could be prior to the
 complex of functional connections to action and imagistic reasoning
 described above" (p. 314). However, it turns out that internalism
 faces a problem that externalism does not, and it seems that this
 is what provides finally a motivation for preferring externalism to
 internalism.
 Before taking that up, however, we should consider whether up to
 this point we have been provided with a reason to think that the
 issue of whether shape properties are categorical is specially con-
 nected with the debate between internalism and externalism. The
 only reason provided appears to be the 'need' to raise the question
 what makes perception of shape as categorical perception of shape.
 Given the kind of answer offered to this question, it is clear that
 'what makes it so' is being interpreted as 'what facts other than the
 fact that the perception is perception of shape are sufficient for it
 to be so'. I cannot see any reason why this question needs to be
 raised at all, or any reason to think that if it must be raised, it
 345
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 must be raised specifically in the case that shape properties are cat-
 egorical. If it must be raised at all, why should it not need to be
 raised equally if shape properties are clusters of conditional powers?
 There is a hint of a reason in Campbell's paper in his discussion of
 what it would mean for perception of shapes to be perceptions of
 shapes as clusters of conditional powers. For it may be that Camp-
 bell thinks of that question as the same question as what makes it
 the case that perception of shape is perception of shape if shape
 properties are clusters of conditional powers. Then he may suppose
 he has given an answer independently of the internalism/externalism
 debate, so that that issue comes up only when we turn to the hy-
 pothesis that shape properties are categorical. But (i) the questions
 are not the same, and (ii) the answer Campbell earlier gives does not
 shed light on either of the questions, since the observation that we
 behave in ways appropriate to how we represent the world is not an
 answer to the question what it means to perceive shapes as clusters
 of conditional powers or to the question what makes representations
 of shapes representations of shapes. The question of the nature of
 shape properties, then, has nothing special to do with the question
 whether shape perception is externalist or not. The discussion of it
 is a red herring.
 As far as the debate between internalism and externalism goes,
 then, we could as well have started with the problem, alluded to
 above, that internalism is supposed to face that externalism does
 not. The problem is supposed to be that
 these sensational characteristics [which form a phenomenal space for
 representing geometry] are supposed to be known from one's own case, it
 is your own experience of shape that gives you knowledge of what these
 sensational characteristics are. So this view has no way of explaining
 what it is for sensational experiences of shape to be the same or different
 in different observers, or for a single observer over a period of time.
 (p. 314)
 In contrast,
 The obvious way of providing an account is to move in the direction of
 the externalist, drawing in environmental considerations, so that same-
 ness or difference of experience depends on the sameness or difference of
 the geometrical properties of the objects perceived. (p. 315)
 What is the problem here? Campbell does not explain. It is unclear
 whether Campbell is worried about how the internalist explains what
 it is for two individuals both to be having a perception of, say, a
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 round object, or whether his concern is with how the internalist can
 explain what it is for two individuals both to be having, say, a visual
 perception of a round object. But in neither case is it obvious what
 the problem is supposed to be. What is it for A and B both to have
 a perceptual state which represents there being a round object in
 front of them? It is for both A and B to have a perceptual state
 which represents a round object in front of them. What is it for A
 and B both to have a visual perceptual state, as opposed to tactile,
 which represents there being a round object in front of them? It
 is for it for A and B both to have a visual perceptual state which
 represents there being a round object in front of them. Why is this
 answer not available to the internalist? Why should the fact that
 the internalist claims (if he does) to know what experience of shape
 is like from his own case raise any difficulty?13 Until more argument
 is forthcoming, we should conclude that there isn't even an apparent
 problem for the internalist in saying what it is for two individuals
 or an individual at two times to be having perceptual states which
 represents shape with the same content.
 Apart from this, we should note that Campbell is assuming that
 any internalist about shape perception would have to appeal to a
 phenomenal space account of shape perception, and that any ex-
 ternalist account would eschew such an account. However, an in-
 ternalist may very well reject a phenomenal space account of shape
 perception. To be an internalist, all that is needed is that one deny
 that the property of having an experience representing a shaped ob-
 ject is a relational property. Being an internalist does not carry any
 commitment about the relation between representations of shape
 and phenomenal content. Similarly, being an externalist does not
 require any commitment to rejecting the phenomenal space account.
 Thus, even if the phenomenal space account were shown to be un-
 tenable, this would not show that externalism was to be favored over
 internalism.
 I suspect that Campbell has assumed that internalism carried a
 commitment to a phenomenal space account of perception of shape
 13It may be that Campbell has in mind passages (esp. sections 258ff) in
 Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations that are sometimes called the pri-
 vate language argument, which is briefly mentioned early in the paper (p. 303).
 These arguments, if they are arguments, amount to little more than the assump-
 tion that we cannot recognize subjective features of our experience and identify
 experiences at different times as the same on the basis of memory. The thought
 that we can recognize something about ourselves in a way no one else can or
 with an authority no one else's can equal is neither a threat to the normativity
 of judgments about experience, nor a guarantee of infallibility.
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 because he assumed that any internalist would want a reductive ac-
 count of shape perception, and assumed that the only possible ac-
 count would be a phenomenal space account. It is by no means clear
 that this would be the only reductionist option available to an inter-
 nalist, so it is unclear even that an internalist with the commitment
 to give a reductive account of perceptual representation of shape
 would face difficulties if it were shown that the phenomenal space
 account could not be maintained.
 Finally, in connection with these last two points, it has occurred
 to me that Campbell may be supposing, though he nowhere says
 this in the paper, that there is a special connection between the
 view that shape properties are categorical and the debate between
 internalism and externalism because he supposes that it is only if
 shape properties are categorical that the internalist must appeal to
 the phenomenal space account of shape perception, with its sup-
 posed attendant difficulties. We have seen that the assumption on
 which this connection is based is false because one can be an in-
 ternalist, and perhaps even a reductive internalist, without adopting
 the phenomenal space account of shape perception. Apart from this,
 however, it is unclear why one would suppose that similar issues did
 not arise for perception of clusters of causal powers through more
 than one sensory modality.
 To sum up, we have found no connection between questions about
 the nature of shape properties and the determination of the con-
 tents of representations of shaped objects. It appears that the main
 line of Campbell's argument is that only externalism could explain
 how perception of shape properties is possible if shape properties
 are categorical. However, on examination, the categoricity of shape
 properties appears to play no role in the argument. The rejection
 of internalism, given the categoricity of shape properties, is instead
 based on an objection to a phenomenal space account of shape per-
 ception. That kind of account, however, is not specially tied to in-
 ternalism or externalism, nor to the categoricity or non-categoricity
 of the properties we perceive objects as having. Thus, the discon-
 nection between the issues is complete.
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 5 What is the relation between externalism and
 the rationality of the cross-modal transfer of
 information, and between externalism and the
 question whether there are phenomenal
 differences between perception of shape in sight
 and touch?
 The argument for a connection between radical externalism and the
 rationality of cross-modal transfer of information is that (i) if exter-
 nalism about shape perception is correct, then there is no difference
 in the phenomenal character of shape experience in sight and touch;
 and (ii) if there is no difference in the phenomenal character of shape
 experience in sight and touch, then "the sameness of property per-
 ceived in sight and touch is transparent to the subject"; and (iii) if
 the sameness of property perceived in sight and touch is transparent
 to the subject, then cross-modal transfer of information is rational
 (p. 304). (i) here, of course, is just [T2]. So a discussion of the
 argument for [T3] involves inter alia a discussion of [T2].
 There are reasons to think that the cross-modal transfer of infor-
 mation is rational regardless of whether internalism or externalism
 is correct (see section 3 and footnote 2). But it is not clear that this
 argument should convince us of it independently even if we grant
 that externalism about shape perception is correct. We have al-
 ready remarked that externalism is independent of the phenomenal
 space account of shape perception, and so independent of the ques-
 tion whether there is a difference in the phenomenal character of
 shape experience in sight and touch. Thus, we have no reason to
 believe (i), and, hence, no reason to believe [T2]. Further, it is not
 clear we have good reason to accept (ii) on the basis of a connection
 between the antecedent and consequent. Suppose that shape expe-
 rience as such has no phenomenal character, and, hence, that there
 is no difference in the phenomenal character of shape experiences
 in sight and touch. Is it obvious that the content of experiences
 of shape should therefore be transparent to the subject? I can see
 that one may want to hold as a general matter than the contents of
 experiences are transparent, or at least accessible in consciousness,
 to their subject -I believe this is correct- but this does not seem
 to follow from the remark that there is no phenomenal difference
 between perception of shape in sight and touch. In addition, if one
 does hold the view that the contents of experience are accessible to
 the subject, then it is not clear why phenomenal differences would
 349
This content downloaded from 
            140.182.176.13 on Tue, 04 Aug 2020 21:29:24 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 350 KIRK LUDWIG
 prevent a subject from recognizing that he perceives the same shape
 by sight and touch, since, by hypothesis, the representational content
 of the perceptions, even if involving different phenomenal characters,
 are the same. Thus, it does not seem that phenomenal sameness of
 shape representation in sight and touch is what is crucial to question
 whether cross-modal transfer of information is rational.
 6 Conclusion
 I conclude that shape properties are categorical, that the cross-
 modal transfer of information is rational, but that Campbell has
 given us no reason to think that any of [T1]-[T3] is correct.
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